home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
TIME: Almanac 1990
/
1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso
/
time
/
041089
/
04108900.030
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1990-09-22
|
3KB
|
62 lines
THE UNION, Page 58AMERICA ABROADTHE NEED FOR NEW THINKING
By Strobe Talbott
If a computer were to design the ideal President to deal with
Mikhail Gorbachev, it might whir and buzz and come up with George
Bush. As Ambassador to the United Nations, Bush got to know the
folkways of the world forum where Gorbachev has been concentrating
much of his genius for public diplomacy. As the U.S.'s man in
China, Bush had a crash course in Communism and geopolitics. As
director of Central Intelligence, he learned what KGB networks and
Soviet missile warheads could do to the West on a bad day. As Vice
President, he met as many General Secretaries as he helped bury
(three).
Bush is genuinely fascinated by Soviet affairs. He has
frequently held private weekend seminars with experts on the
subject, and he chose card-carrying Kremlinologists for the top two
jobs on the National Security Council staff. One of the first
documents Bush signed as President was an order to the Executive
Branch to reassess relations and recommend a strategy that looks
ahead to the next century. The review is supposed to be an American
answer to Gorbachev's "new thinking." Yet to meet that challenge,
the study may have to work its way free of attitudes and
assumptions that could make fresh initiatives difficult.
Part of the problem is that Bush's Administration came into
office on probation in the eyes of the Republican hard right and
wary of appearing susceptible to Gorbomania. Some members of the
new team seem to relish the chance to sound tougher than their
predecessors. A number of Bush aides have privately derided Ronald
Reagan for his arm-in-arm stroll through Red Square with Gorbachev
at their summit meeting last June and for proclaiming the Evil
Empire a thing of the past.
Some of these advisers also seem convinced that what forced
the Soviet Union to begin mending its aggressive, repressive ways
was U.S. pressure of the past 40 years, so no change in U.S. policy
is in order now. This line of argument underestimates the internal
origins of Soviet reform. Gorbachev is not so much saying "uncle"
to Uncle Sam as he is addressing the failures of the
Leninist-Stalinist system. Moreover, he is doing so in a way that
is earning him worldwide credit for being flexible and
forward-looking, while the U.S. is in danger of appearing sluggish
and uncertain.
Yet the Bush Administration seems eager to play down the
importance of Gorbachev himself. It is only prudent, of course, to
hedge against the possibility of Gorbachev's demise. But the
Administration risks going too far in assuming, imprudently, that
favorable trends in Soviet domestic and foreign policy are
irreversible -- no matter who the General Secretary is -- and not
far enough in taking advantage of the immediate opportunities that
Gorbachev himself represents. For example, his willingness to trim
Soviet military muscle might give the U.S. a welcome chance to
rethink some of its own more expensive superweapons.
The Administration needs and deserves time to prepare its
approach. The policy review is still a work in progress. But it
would be a shame if it ended up being a rationalization for
American old thinking and an all-purpose, platitudinous
prescription for dealing not with Gorbachev but his successor.